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GOD V. GAYS?
THE RIGHTS OF SEXUAL MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
As SEEN THROUGH THE DOOMED EXISTENCE
OF THE BRAZILIAN RESOLUTION
Timothy Garvey*
INTRODUCTION

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." 1 For more than two hundred
years, this sweeping statement from the United States Declaration of Independence
has provided the starting point for conceptions of human rights. While radical at
the time of the Declaration's signing, the notion "that all men are created equal" 2 is
now a fundamental concept of human rights embraced by the international
community.
Following the barbarous human rights violations perpetrated during World
War II, the United Nations (UN) prepared its own declaration embracing this
notion of equality. Ratified in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) states:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights ....
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
3
property, birth or other status.
Almost universally since the writing of the UDHR, international human rights
documents have been routinely imbued with a spirit of equality and justice for all
people. In fact, since the dawn of the twenty-first century, most of the world's
recently-formed or recently-amended constitutions include language expressly

*University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected 2010. An earlier version of this article
placed second in the 2009 Leonard B. Sutton International Law Writing Competition. I would like to
thank Professor Ved Nanda for encouraging me to seek publication, Professor Catherine Smith for her
many helpful suggestions, the staff of the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy for its
willingness to publish students' work, and my fianc6e Jodie Kranz for her excellent editing skills and
continued support of my academic endeavors. Although all those mentioned above provided much
assistance and guidance, any errors, omissions, or defects in this article are solely my own.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

2. Id.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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stating just that.4 But equality in form and equality in substance appear to be two
different things.
Throughout the world, numerous groups are routinely denied the equality
supposedly assured to them under their state constitutions or various international
documents, such as the UDHR. One group consistently denied the right of
equality is a group that international human rights scholar and professor Jack
Donnelly refers to as "sexual minorities."' This term, as used by Professor
Donnelly, includes not only those typically associated with sexual orientation
issues-persons who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgendered (LGBT)6 -but
it is also meant to include "any group (previously, now, or in the future)
stigmatized or despised as a result of sexual orientation, identity, or behavior."
According to Professor Donnelly, "[i]n almost all countries, sexual minorities
suffer under substantial civil disabilities." While the most extreme violation, the
imposition of the death penalty, is mostly limited to Islamic states,9 discrimination
against sexual minorities manifests itself in numerous other ways throughout the
world.
To be sure, within the past two decades, the international community has
increasingly recognized the rights of sexual minorities. However, sexual minorities
are still subject to innumerable injustices in a significant portion of the world.
Even when excluding the nearly universal animus toward same-sex marriage, 10

4. Of the eighteen national constitutions promulgated, ratified, adopted, enforced, or amended
since the year 2000, no fewer than 16 contain references to equality. See, e.g., PERUSTUSLAKI
[Constitution] ch. 2 § 6 (Fin.) ("everyone is equal before the law"); IRAQ CONST. ch. 2, pt. 1, art. 14
("Iraqis are equal before the law"), available at http://confinder.richmond.edu.
5. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2003).
6. LGBT is the acronym most commonly used to refer to this group of individuals, although
numerous others exist. Other common versions include GLBT (gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, transgendered),
LGBTIQ (with the 'I' signifying persons who are 'intersexed' and the 'Q' signifying persons who are
'queer' or 'questioning'), a term gaining more prevalence in the field is LBGTTTIQ (here the additional
'T's are intended to signify persons who are 'transsexual and transsensual' or alternately 'transsexual
and two-spirited'). For the purposes of this article I will use the term "sexual minorities" as being
inclusive of all of these groups. The decision to do so is done only for the purpose of readability, and is
in no way meant to diminish or undermine those who would choose to use a term other than "sexual
minorities."
7. DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 229.
8. Id. at 230 (providing a list of examples, many of them horrific, describing the practice of many
countries to impose incarceration, and in several instances execution, for such minor homosexual acts
as same-sex couples holding hands or kissing in public).
9. Id. at 230 n.1.
10. Same-sex marriages are allowed internationally in only seven countries (Belgium, Canada,
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden). Additionally, a few states within the United
States allow same-sex marriages (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont as
well as the District of Columbia). Lornet Turnbull, On Gay Rights, World, U.S. Continue to Shift,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A12, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html
/localnews/2010738123_gaychanges08m.html. Additionally, a few countries will recognize foreign
same-sex marriages, even though some of them will not allow such marriages to occur within their own
borders (Aruba, Israel, France, Netherlands Antilles, and within the United States - New York). See
ILGA, LGBTI Rights in the World, http://www.ilga.org/ilga/en/article/1161 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
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sexual minorities are subject to "persistent human rights violations"" that range
from death and torture, 12 to inequitable access regarding housing and education,13
to the forced imposition of attaining heterosexual norms, 14 and "pressure to remain
silent and invisible."1 5 Laws criminalizing sodomy and other homosexual acts still
exist in nearly eighty countries. 16 In fact, it was not until 2003 that the Supreme
Court of the United States of America struck down sodomy laws for violating
notions of liberty and equality.17 Before that decision, many states in the U.S.,
with the consent of the U.S. Supreme Court, criminalized the act of adult males
engaging in consensual sodomy in the privacy of their own homes.1 8
Given this list of inequalities, it is impossible to deny the fact that sexual
minorities are not granted substantive equality-even in countries that purport to
guarantee such equality. In an attempt to combat these continuing injustices
suffered by sexual minorities, Brazil introduced a resolution during the 2003
Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (the Commission). The
Resolution on Human Rights and Sexual Orientation (the Brazilian Resolution)
simply sought to acknowledge the occurrence of human rights violations due to the
sexual orientation of the victim and to reaffirm that the principles of the
International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) apply to all individuals including
sexual minorities. 19 Unfortunately, for reasons detailed below, the Brazilian
Resolution never even made it to a vote before the Commission.

11. Michael O'Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law: Contextualisingthe Yogyakarta Principles,8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 208 (2008).
12. Id. at 208-10.
13. Id. at 211.
14. Id. at 208.
15. Id. This article's purpose is not to recount all the injustices suffered by sexual minorities
throughout the world; however, those interested in a deeper discussion of that issue may wish to read
the cited article. Another good source of information is AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CRIMES OF HATE,
CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT BASED ON SEXUAL IDENTITY (2001),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT40/016/2001/en.
16. See DANIEL OTTOSSON, INTERNATIONAL LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX
ASSOCIATION, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME-SEX
ACTIVITY BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS 4 (2008), available at http://www.ilga.org/state

homophobia/ILGA State Sponsored Homophobia 2008.pdf ("[in 2008, no less than 86 member
states of the United Nations still criminalize consensual same-sex acts among adults, thus institutionally
promoting a culture of hatred. Among those, 7 have legal provisions with death penalty as punishment.
To those 86 countries, one must add 6 provinces or territorial units which also punish homosexuality
with imprisonment.").
17. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("[t]he State cannot demean a homosexual
person's existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. 'It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter' (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992))).
18. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (holding no "fundamental right [for]
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy") (overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538
(2003)).
19. The Brazilian Resolution on Human Rights and Sexual Orientation, U.N. Econ & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC] 59th Sess., U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/2003/L.92 (April 17, 2003) (proposed but not
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This paper explores the story of the Brazilian Resolution. Part I discusses the
Brazilian Resolution's history. In so doing, it examines prior attempts to legislate
the rights of sexual minorities, as well as prior attempts to adjudicate such rights
within international law. Part I also discusses how those prior attempts to create a
body of law regarding sexual orientation presented an inherent problem in Brazil's
presentation of the Brazilian Resolution and discusses how those problems
materialized once Brazil introduced it to the Commission.
In preventing the Commission from voting on the Brazilian Resolution, those
who so vehemently opposed it presented three main arguments against its
introduction. First, they argued that issues of gender and sexuality do not fall
within the concern of international human rights.20 Second, they argued that the
term "sexual orientation" is not adequately defined in international law. 2 1 Finally,
they argued that religious law prevents them from accepting a notion of equality
for sexual minorities.22
Part II of this paper examines and subsequently dismisses each of these
arguments. It explains why, despite arguments to the contrary, issues of gender
and sexuality fall squarely within the concern of international human rights law. It
also counters the second argument by proving that the term "sexual orientation" is
clearly defined in international law. It then takes a step back and examines the
issue from a broader perspective-looking at the role of religious law within the
context of international law. In accepting the third argument as true-that religious
law prevents them from ever accepting a notion of equality for sexual minoritiesthe third subsection of part II explains how such an argument necessarily denies
citizens of their right to freedom of religion, thereby invalidating that argument as

well.
Finally, Part III briefly discusses events subsequent to the Brazilian
Resolution's demise. Although the Brazilian Resolution failed to make it to a vote
before the Commission, its existence was not in vain. The mere introduction of the
Brazilian Resolution considerably raised the concern of human rights for sexual
minorities within the international sphere. Since 2003, international organizations,
acting both within and outwith the UN, have actively pursued the acknowledgment
and rectification of human rights violations due to the sexual orientation of the
victim. Both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs) joined these efforts with the motivatation of forcing states to
recognize that the spirit and the plain language of the UDHR is meant to do what it
says: ensure "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,

adopted), available at http://www.arc-international.net/L92.html [hereinafter Brazilian Resolution].
20. Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in InternationalLaw, INT'L GAY &
LESBIAN ASS'N FILES: U.N. COMM'N ON HUM. RTS, Nov. 5, 2005, http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/577

(stating that opponents circulated a letter asserting that in their perspective sexual orientation is not a
human rights issue).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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religion, political or other opinion." 23 Accordingly, Part III discusses a few of
these advancements made in the wake of the Brazilian Resolution.
I. THE BRAZILIAN RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & SEXUAL ORIENTATION

What is commonly referred to as the Brazilian Resolution is an international
document officially titled The Brazilian Resolution on Human Rights & Sexual
Orientation.24 Brazil presented the Resolution during the 59th Session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (Commission) on April 17, 2003 .25 The purpose of
the Brazilian Resolution was the promotion and protection of human rights for
sexual minorities.26
The Brazilian Resolution did not seek to establish any new rights for sexual
minorities. By its plain text, it merely sought to reaffirm (as applied to sexual
minorities) rights already granted to all persons in documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),;
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 27
Based upon the rights already established in the aforementioned documents,
the Brazilian Resolution "[e]xpress[ed] deep concern at the occurrence of
violations of human rights in the world against persons based on their sexual
orientation," 28 and it "[s]tress[ed] that human rights and fundamental freedoms are
the birthright of all human beings ... and ... should not be hindered in any way
on the grounds of sexual orientation." 29 It also "[c]all[ed] upon States to promote
and protect the human rights of all persons regardless of their sexual orientation."30
It further "[r]equest[ed] the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
to pay due attention to the violation of human rights on the grounds of sexual
orientation."31
A. The Historyof the Brazilian Resolution
The Brazilian Resolution's history is rather minor-mostly because Brazil
gave no advance warning that it was going to propose such a resolution and
introduced it during the final days of the 2003 Session. 32 However novel the
Brazilian Resolution may have seemed at the time of its introduction, it was not the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

UDHR, supranote 3, art. 2.
Brazilian Resolution, supranote 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sanders, supra note 20. The 59th session of the Commission ended on April 25th, 2003.
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first attempt by a UN member state to bring issues concerning sexual orientation to
the attention of the UN. In fact, "Brazil ha[d] been at the forefront of government
efforts to include language on sexual orientation and human rights in the context of
the UN" since 2001.
Nonetheless, Brazil should have been more cautious with
the Resolution's introduction, as even the most minor prior attempts to insert
recognition of rights for sexual minorities into international documents were
routinely met with staunch criticism.34
Much of the earliest work concerning the recognition of human rights for
sexual minorities was done within the European system-not the UN. 3 Relatively
speaking, the UN has been slow to recognize human rights for sexual minorities,
despite its assurances of equality. And while other international organizations
began doing so as early as the 1980s, it is only since the 1990s that UN member
states have consistently attempted to work the concerns of sexual minorities into
the language of UN documents. However, as previously mentioned, such attempts
were routinely plagued with problems, and it was not until the twenty-first century
that member states made any consistent progress. Accordingly, those who criticize
Brazil's late introduction of its Resolution assert that, had Brazil followed the lead
of those advocating for the rights of sexual minorities within Europe, the rights of
sexual minorities within the UN may have faired better.36
The following subsections give a short history of the fight for recognition of
human rights for sexual minorities in international law. As previously mentioned,
the UN was not nearly as quick as other international organizations in recognizing
such rights. Accordingly, this section concentrates on other organizations'
attempts, while only briefly discussing such attempts within the UN. The first
subsection examines prior attempts to legislate rights of sexual minorities in
international law, and the second subsection examines prior attempts to adjudicate
rights for sexual minorities in international law.
1. Prior Attempts to Legislate Rights of Sexual Minorities
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the UN's legislative process was routinely
plagued with an inability to insert language regarding sexual orientation into any
UN document.37 Even into the early 2000s, attempts to add such language to UN
documents repeatedly failed.38 This was so, despite the fact that most of these

33. INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM'N, RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND

HUMAN RIGHTS: CAMPAIGN DOSSIER 4 (2003), available at http://www.iglhrc.org/binarydata/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/213-1.pdf.
34. See Sanders,supra note 20 (describing numerous failed attempts to insert language concerning
sexual minorities into U.N. documents).
35. Id. (discussing the history of rights for sexual minorities in international law).
36. See Pratima Narayan, Somewhere over the Rainbow . . . International Human Rights
Protectionsfor Sexual Minorities in the New Millennium, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 313, 345-46 (2006) ("[o]ne
key failure of the first Brazilian proposal was that the nation's representatives did not offer advance
warning that they would be proposing the bill to gain support").
37. See Sanders,supra note 20 (describing numerous failed attempts to insert language concerning
sexual minorities into U.N. documents).
38. Id.
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attempts sought only to add language expressly recognizing that sexual minorities
were included within the scope of a proposed document. While there were many
UN members who opposed the insertion of such language, those countries with
strong national ties to religion (mostly Catholic or Islamic) were the most
vehement in their opposition.39
It is only within the twenty-first century that the UN has made consistent
progress in inserting language recognizing the rights of sexual minorities. Those
acknowledgments, few as they are, have come sporadically and with much debate
and concession.40
The . . . (CESCR) has dealt with [sexual orientation discrimination] in
its General Comments . . . Nos 18 of 2005 (on the right to work), 15 of

2002 (on the right to water) and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the highest
attainable standard of health), it has indicated that the Covenant
proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sex and sexual
orientation "that has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the
equal enjoyment or exercise of [the right at issue]."

The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with the
issue in a General Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of 2003, it
stated that, "State parties have the obligation to ensure that all human
beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention [on the
Rights of the Child] without discrimination (Article 2), including with
regard to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status. These grounds also cover [inter alia] sexual orientation." 41
Additionally, "Concluding Observations" submitted by the CESCR and the CRC
have mentioned sexual-orientation-related discrimination.4 2

Although any acknowledgment regarding non-discrimination of sexual
minorities is significant, it is also significant that those in favor of such rights face
an uphill battle. While the UN allows many NGOs to be involved in lobbying
efforts, such groups must first be granted consultative status. As of 2009, the UN
has not granted consultative status to any NGOs dealing specifically with the rights
of sexual minorities.43
2. Prior Attempts to Adjudicate Rights of Sexual Minorities
Given such limited success in the prior attempts to legislate the rights of
sexual minorities, critics argue that those rights may have been better protected had
Brazil left it to the various judicial and quasi-judicial international human rights
bodies. Such arguments seem appropriate since Europe's international judicial
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 214-15 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 215.
Sanders, supra note 20.
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bodies began recognizing rights for sexual minorities in the early 1980s. 44 In fact,
by the start of the twenty-first century, European law had developed a consistent
body of law protecting sexual minorities.
Conversely, the UN was much slower in recognizing such rights, with its first
decision regarding sexual minorities not coming until the middle of the 1990s. 45
Arguably then, the rights of sexual minorities may have been better protected had
Brazil allowed the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies of the UN to further develop
interpretations of how sexual orientation falls within the context of international
documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), or the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
The following subsections further examine the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR)46 and the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHRC), as regards sexual minorities.
a. Prior Attempts to Adjudicate Rights of Sexual Minorities within the European
Court of Human Rights
To best understand the prior attempts to adjudicate rights of sexual minorities,
it is necessary to first look outside of the UN to Europe where those rights were
first recognized. While the UN judicial bodies were not particularly quick to
acknowledge the rights of sexual minorities, their European counterparts were (at
least comparatively speaking). Starting in the early 1980s, the ECHR slowly
began developing a series of decisions that upheld the basic rights of sexual
minorities. While development of this body of law was slow, it was nonetheless
consistent.
Throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the ECHR consistently struck
down sodomy laws as violating notions of privacy.48 The ECHR first applied such
a rationale in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom in 1981, finding that a Northern Ireland
law criminalizing male homosexual activity violated the petitioner's right to

44. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Fur. H.R. Rep. 149, 63 (1981),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight
=dudgeon&sessionid=52029168&skin=hudoc-en (holding Northern Ireland's laws prohibiting buggery
and acts of homosexual indecency constitute "a breach of Article 8" of the European Convention on
Human Rights).
45. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. H.R. Comm., No. 488, 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992
(1994), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48298b8d2.html
(determining that a
Tasmanian statute prohibiting private homosexual behavior violates articles 17, paragraph 1, juncto 2,
paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
46. Until 1998, the European Convention on Human Rights operated under a dual system. There
was the European Court of Human Rights, and for those who lacked access to the Court (most often due
to the Court's refusal to hear cases of individuals) there was the European Commission of Human
Rights. However, in 1998 all state parties to the Convention accepted Protocol 11, which abolished the
Commission and allowed the Court to hear more cases (including those of individuals). For the
purposes of this essay, ECHR will refer to the decisions of either body.
47. Sanders, supra note 20.
48. Id.
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respect for his private life. 49 In subsequent cases regarding sodomy laws, the
ECHR continued to apply Dudgeon, and repeatedly struck down sodomy laws. 0
But, beyond striking down sodomy laws, the ECHR was reluctant to apply the
rationale of Dudgeon to other notions of privacy regarding homosexual activity.
Such was the state of the law until 1997; the ECHR struck down sodomy laws on
privacy grounds, but other laws regulating homosexual activity survived.
It was not until 1997 that the ECHR finally began to expand on that basic
notion of privacy it found in Dudgeon. However, in a few a short years the ECHR
dramatically expanded its jurisprudence in the area, and by the end of the twentieth
century it had a full body of law protecting the rights of sexual minorities. This
jurisprudential renaissance began in 1997 when the ECHR struck down a United
Kingdom law that established an unequal age of consent for heterosexual and
homosexual acts.52 Within the next three years, the ECHR also found the U.K.'s
discriminatory ban on homosexuals in the military to be unnecessary,53 and ruled
that a father, who lost custody of his child because of his homosexuality, had been
unfairly deprived of his rights.54
With the dawn of the twenty-first century, the ECHR continued to expand its
jurisprudence regarding sexual minorities. In 2002, the ECHR ruled that a male to
female transsexual could lawfully marry a man.
In 2003, the ECHR "upheld
successor tenancy rights for same-sex partners."56 Crystallizing the differences
between the ECHR of the twentieth century with that of the twenty-first century,

49. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur. Ct. HR T 63 (holding Northern Ireland's laws prohibiting buggery and
acts of homosexual indecency constitute "a breach of Article 8" of the European Convention on Human
Rights).
50. See Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. HR Rep. 186 (1989)
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlightnorris%/o201
o2Ov.%o2 0 20ireland&sessionid=52029506&skin=hudoc-en (holding that an Irish law criminalizing
homosexuality violates Articles 8 & 25 of the ICCPR); Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89 16 Eur.
HR Rep. 485 (1993), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm
&action=html&highlight-Modinos%20|%20v.%201%2OCyprus&sessionid=52029568&skin=hudoc-en
(holding that a Cyprus law prohibiting homosexuality violates Article 8 of the ICCPR).
51. Sanders, supra note 20.
52. Sutherland v. United Kingdom (striking out), 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item1 &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=sutherland%201%20v.%2
01%20united%201%20kingdom&sessionid=52029703&skin hudoc-en.
53. Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlightLustigPrean&sessionid=52029837&skin hudoc-en.
54. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action html&highlight=33290/96&sessionid=520
29866&skin=hudoc-en.
55. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://cmiskp.echr.
coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-goodwinv.unitedkingdom&ses
sionid=46838382&skin=hudoc-en.
56. Sanders, supra note 20 (citing Karner v. Austria, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action-html&highlight40016/98&
sessionid=52029974&skin=hudoc-en).
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the ECHR stated in Karner v Austria, "[j]ust like differences based on sex,
differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way
of justification."57
Such a bold statement, equating sexual orientation
discrimination with sex-based discrimination, perfectly exemplifies the ECHR's
jurisprudential shift. Whereas the ECHR of the twentieth century refused to
expand protections for sexual minorities, the twenty-first century ECHR equated
discrimination against sexual minorities with that of gender-based discrimination.
To be sure, this jurisprudential shift did not occur overnight. In fact, it could
not have. It was only by creating a consistent body of law protecting the basic
rights of sexual minorities that the ECHR was subsequently able to understand the
full scope of such rights and begin to expand those rights. Without the welldocumented complaints of sexual minorities from a period spanning nearly two
decades, it is unlikely that the ECHR could have ever recognized the rights of
sexual minorities on par with those of women. However, because the ECHR had
such a record, it was able to properly assert such a claim.
b. Prior attempts to adjudicate rights of sexual minorities within the United Nations
Human Rights Committee
Most of the UN's disputes regarding sexual minorities arose as an issue under
the ICCPR. As such, those disputes were subject to the jurisdiction of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. 8 While the ECHR began to recognize rights
for sexual minorities in the early 1980s, it was not until nearly a decade and a half
later (1994) that the UNHRC first recognized such rights.
Much like the ECHR, the UNHRC's first opinion recognizing rights for
sexual minorities involved a complaint regarding a member state's sodomy laws.
In Toonen v. Australia, Nicholas Toonen filed a communication with the UNHRC
alleging that Tasmania's sodomy law (Australia's last remaining sodomy law)
violated his right to privacy under articles 2, paragraphs 1, 17, and 26 of the
ICCPR.5 9 While the UNHRC could have simply declared the Tasmanian law to be
in violation of the ICCPR, it went much further. Not only did the UNHRC agree
with Toonen that the law interfered with his privacy rights under the ICCPR,60 it
further asserted that the ICCPR prohibits any discrimination based on sexual
orientation. In drawing such a conclusion, the UNHRC declared "the reference to

57. Karner, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. 137.
58. While not an official judicial body, the UNHRC operates as a quasi-judicial body within the
UN. It was established to oversee the compliance of states party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). The UNHRC allows for individuals within States that have adopted the
ICCPR to obtain an opinion regarding violations of the ICCPR. However, those opinions are nonbinding and are merely the interpretation of the UNHRC. See Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htn (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). Most of the UN "cases" dealing with
discrimination of sexual minorities have arisen as an issue under the ICCPR, and thus were subject to
the opinions of the UNHCR.
59. Toonen, U.N.H.R. Comm., No. 488 T 3.1.
60. Id. at 18.2.
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'sex' in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual
orientation," 61 rather than simply referring to gender.
Since this landmark decision, the UNHRC's jurisprudence regarding sexual
minorities has kept pace with that of the ECHR. The UNHRC, much like the
ECHR, has subsequently found "that sexual orientation-related discrimination is a
suspect category in terms of the enjoyment of the [ICCPR] rights . . . .

The

[UN]HRC has persistently observed, however, that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation .

.

. is not inherently invidious .

.

. as long as it is based on

reasonable and objective criteria." 62
Although the UNHRC was not as quick as the ECHR to recognize the rights
of sexual minorities, at the time Brazil introduced the Brazilian Resolution, the
UNHRC had addressed the issue of sexual minorities on several occasions. More
importantly, the UNHRC was even going so far as to repeatedly assert that
violations of human rights based on sexual orientation violated the ICCPR by
slowly developing a consistent series of decisions protecting the rights of sexual
minorities. While it is true that the decisions of the UNHRC are non-binding, it is
also true that the UNHRC was much more open to recognizing rights for sexual
minorities than were the member states involved in the UN's legislative process.
Accordingly, the following sections of Part I discuss the problems inherent in
Brazil's promulgation of the Brazilian Resolution, and how those problems
manifested once it was introduced.
B. The Problems Inherent in Brazil's Promulgation and Presentation of its
Resolution
A number of scholars have written articles about the Brazilian Resolution, but
those articles have rarely discussed the Resolution's inherent problems. While the
ideals behind the Brazilian Resolution-the protection of rights for sexual
minorities-are commendable, the Resolution was arguably flawed from the outset.
And, those flaws manifested into foreseeable issues once Brazil introduced the
Resolution to the UNHRC. This section discusses each of these perspectives.
Section I examines the problems inherent in the mere promulgation of the
Brazilian Resolution, while section II discusses how those problems manifested
upon its introduction to the Commission.
1. The Problems Inherent in Brazil's Promulgation of the Resolution
As discussed above, prior attempts to insert language concerning sexual
orientation into UN documents were routinely met with much hostility and marred
by zealous resistance.63 While Brazil occasionally succeeded at inserting language
protecting the human rights of sexual minorities into UN documents, these were
only very recent developments. 64 Over the course of the preceding decade, the
61. Id. at T 8.7. See also O'Flaherty & Fisher,supra note 11, at 216 (discussing the implications
of Toonen).
62. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 216-17 (citing Young v. Australia, U.N.H.R. Comm.,
No. 941, T 104, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003)).
63. Sanders, supra note 20.
64. Id.
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majority of attempts to work the phrase "sexual orientation" into even non-binding
UN documents, such as conference statements, failed repeatedly.65 As such, prior
to introducing its Resolution, Brazil should have either: (1) waited for the
international courts and committees to develop a more concrete view of the subject
matter, or (2) made sure that it had enough supporters to pass the Resolution.
However, Brazil did neither.
Brazil's decision to stop waiting for the judicial branch to fully recognize
such rights is understandable. After all, rights for sexual minorities had been a
(minor) concern of international law for more than twenty years by the time it
introduced its Resolution. 66 Furthermore, the sexual-minority jurisprudence of the
UNHRC was behind that of the ECHR, and perhaps Brazil felt that the issue
deserved more immediate attention.
Brazil's decision to forgo the second option-securing enough votes to pass
the Resolution-is more questionable. Despite Brazil's awareness that several
member states were fiercely opposed to the UN's recognition of rights for sexual
minorities, Brazil gave no advance warning to other states that it was going to
introduce its Resolution and introduced it during the final days of the 2003
session.67 Understandably, its brash decision to do so caught many states offguard. In fact, the Brazilian Resolution's introduction was so surprising that a
large number of states that might have otherwise supported the Resolution
abstained from voting on the motion. 68 After its introduction, as discussed in
further detail below, states did not vote on the Brazilian Resolution in 2003, and it
was held over to the following session.
Given that the adjudication of rights for sexual minorities had been much
more favorable than the legislation of such rights, the Brazilian Resolution would
have faired better had Brazil simply waited for the judiciary to recognize the rights
asserted by its Resolution. While neither the ECHR nor the UNHRC universally
recognized rights for sexual minorities, they were both quicker (and more
successful) in granting judicial protections against discrimination based on sexual
orientation than member states were in legislating such protections. Another
advantage of advancing such rights through the judicial process is that it allows
advocates to avoid the stalling tactics often employed by states opposed to
recognition of such rights. Quite foreseeably, those opposed to the Brazilian
Resolution immediately employed such tactics, which led to the Resolution's
ultimate demise.
2. The Flaws in Brazil's Introduction of its Resolution
Having been essentially doomed from its inception, the Brazilian Resolution
fared no better once introduced. Introduced on April 17, 2003, the Brazilian
65. See id. (describing failed attempts at The Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and
The World Conference on Racism (2001), among others).
66. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. T 63 (holding in 1981 that sodomy laws constitute a breach of
the European Convention on Human Rights).
67. Sanders, supra note 20.
68. Id.
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Resolution was immediately entwined in a political quagmire. While twenty seven
co-sponsors immediately supported the Resolution,69 there was fierce opposition
from both the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and various Vaticaninfluenced states, as well as the Holy See itself.70 Those states combined to form a
conglomeration of more than fifty states strongly opposed to the measure based on
religious grounds. 71 They were so opposed, that several Islamic states
immediately moved for a vote of "no action," which would have kept the
Resolution from even being heard on the floor of the Commission.72 However,
that motion was successfully voted down.73 Nonetheless, the Resolution failed to
make it to a vote of the Commission in 2003. Just a few days after Brazil
introduced its Resolution, the Commission voted 24 to 17 (with 10 states
abstaining) to hold over discussion of the Brazilian Resolution until the
Commission's 2004 session.74
Despite the best efforts of many NGOs advocating for the passage of the
Brazilian Resolution, it fared no better during the Commission's 2004 session. In
fact, it faired worse. Although the Commission voted in 2003 to hold-over
discussion of the Brazilian Resolution until the 2004 session, considerable pressure
from the Catholic/Islamic alliance convinced Brazil to withdraw its Resolution
from the 2004 session. In 2005, the Brazilian Resolution died a quite death when
76
Brazil failed to re-introduce it to the Commission.
Had Brazil thought about the possible (or even probable) repercussions of the
Resolution's failure, it may not have introduced it so impulsively. However,
because the Resolution was introduced and roundly dismissed, it now presents two
major problems. First, states may now be free to refuse to grant its citizens the

rights advocated by the Brazilian Resolution. That is to say, states may now argue
that because the Commission never even voted on the Brazilian Resolution, it did
not (and does not) intend for sexual minorities to be included within the documents
invoked by the Brazilian Resolution's language. Second, some may argue that
because states expressly refused to accept the language of the Brazilian Resolution,
such states cannot be bound by any interpretations of those documents that include
protections for sexual minorities-including non-binding judicial interpretations.
Additionally, it seems highly likely that had Brazil never presented its Resolution,
the UNHRC would have continued to protect the rights of sexual minoritieseventually securing the rights advocated by the Brazilian Resolution. Moreover,
those opinions would have been powerfully persuasive over those states that would
ignore such rights.
6 9. Id.
70. Id; Narayan, supranote 36, at 341.
71. Juan Perez Cabral, Vatican, Muslim States Slam Queer Human Rights: Arm-twisting,
ProceduralShenanigans at UN in Geneva, THE GULLY, Apr. 25, 2003, http://www.thegully.com/
essays/gaymundo/030425_UN vatican muslims.html.
72. Sanders, supra note 20.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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While the Commission failed to pass the Brazilian Resolution (or even vote
on it), the Resolution succeeded in raising the profile of issues concerning sexual
minorities. When it became apparent that the Resolution would not pass, several
countries formed their own statements on the issue of sexual orientation.77 Part III
discusses those statements; however, Part II first discusses many of the inherent
flaws in the arguments of the Catholic/Islamic alliance that so vehemently opposed
the Brazilian Resolution.
II. THE INHERENT FLAWS IN THE ARGUMENTS

AGAINST

THE

BRAZILIAN

RESOLUTION'S ADOPTION

While this paper criticizes Brazil's presentation of its Resolution, it is not
meant to suggest that Brazil was at fault for the Resolution's demise. It was not.
In fact, one can argue that those most responsible for the Resolution's death were
those silent states that failed to support the Brazilian Resolution out of fear for
political repercussions. The truth of the matter is that the Brazilian Resolution was
a simple re-affirmation of basic human rights for sexual minorities and should have
been passed. This Part II examines why this is so, exposing the flaws in the
arguments of those who so vehemently opposed adoption of the Brazilian
Resolution.
Although the Catholic/Islamic alliance was successful in leading the Brazilian
Resolution to a rather quiet death, it did not need to be that way. The flaws in their
arguments against recognition of human rights for sexual minorities are threefold.
First, the Organization of the Islamic Conference's (OIC) assertion that sexualorientation discrimination is not a concern for the global south, 8 while potentially
true, is simply inapposite with the goals of international human rights laws. While
it may not be a concern of the global south, that does not negate the fact that
human rights violations against sexual minorities still occur-nor does it excuse
them. Second, at various points throughout the debates surrounding the Brazilian
Resolution, the opponents asserted that the term "sexual orientation" had not been
defined in international law. 79 However, as discussed below, such a statement is
simply erroneous. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, those opposing the
Brazilian Resolution did so out of a religious bias,80 a bias that, as also discussed
below, necessarily violates international law. The following sections examine each
of these issues in turn.
A. Issues of Gender and Sexuality Fall Squarely within the Concern of
InternationalHuman Rights Law81
Once

introduced, the Brazilian Resolution was met with immediate

77. Id. The various statements are discussed in detail below, infra Part II.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The title of this subsection is borrowed from a quote of Nicholas Bamforth wherein he makes
such an assertion. See Nicholas Bamforth, Introduction to AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SEX RIGHTS:
OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1 (Nicholas Bamforth ed., 2005) (stating "issues of gender and sexuality
fall squarely within the concern of international human rights law").
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opposition. Those states most opposed to the Brazilian Resolution's introduction
were Islamic and Catholic states. Additionally, both the Vatican and the OIC
circulated letters urging states not to adopt the Brazilian Resolution. The letter
circulated by the OIC between the Commission's 2003 and 2004 sessions stated,
among other things, that in the OIC's perspective sexual orientation is not a human
rights issue. 82
While such a statement may have persuaded some states against voting for the
Brazilian Resolution, the veracity of the assertion is questionable. It is true that
those within the OIC may not believe sexual orientation to be a human rights issue,
but there are many who disagree. Numerous scholars, many advocating the
recognition of human rights for sexual minorities, repeatedly assert just the
opposite. As Nicholas Bamforth states in the introduction to an Amnesty
International article, "[t]hat issues of gender and sexuality fall squarely within the
concern of international and national human rights law cannot be doubted." 83 That
is, "at least if one believes that human rights concern a person's ability to lead a
valuable life free from oppression."84
While many scholars write on the topic of sexual orientation and human
rights, " the scholarly argument is not the only one opposed to the OIC's view.
The full body of international law also supports the notion that sexual orientation is
an issue within international law. Throughout the world, sexual minorities
routinely experience persecution and a denial of rights granted to the sexual
majority.8 6 Accordingly, such discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has
been ruled to be violative of both the ICCPR 7 and the ECHR, concern over such
discrimination has found its way into numerous international documents 89 and
numerous NGOs focus specifically on human rights violations that affect sexual
minorities. 90 With so many players in the field of international human rights law
82. Sanders, supra note 20.
83. Bamforth, supranote 81, at 1.
84. Id. at 14.
85. For an in-depth discussion of this topic, see generally Vincent J. Samar, "Family" and the
PoliticalLandscape for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People (LGBT): Gay-Rights as a
ParticularInstantatiationofHuman Rights, 64 ALB. L. REv. 983 (2001).
86. See O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 11, at 211 (describing numerous forms of persecution
endured by sexual minorities).
87. See Toonen, U.N.H.R. Comm'n, No. 488, 1 8.3 (determining that a Tasmanian statute
prohibiting private homosexual behavior violates articles 17, paragraph 1, juncto 2, paragraph 1, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
88. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 63 (holding Northern Ireland's laws prohibiting buggery and
acts of homosexual indecency constitute "a breach of Article 8" of the European Convention on Human
Rights).
89. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supranote 11, at 214-15.
90. For various political reasons, however, most of those groups have been denied observer status
within the UN. One of the major international organizations dealing with the rights of sexual minorities
is the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA). ILGA was initially granted observer status
within ECOSOC in 1994, but that status was rescinded at the behest of the United States in 1994. Since
then, all attempts to gain observer status by groups representing sexual minorities have been denied.
For a more in-depth discussion of this topic, see Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual
Orientation in InternationalLaw, INT'L GAY & LESBIAN Ass'N FILES: U.N. COMM'N ON HUM. RTs,
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spending time on protecting the rights of sexual minorities, it was disingenuous for
the OIC to assert that sexual orientation is not a concern of international law.
Not only are such rights a clearly recognized concern of international human
rights law, international bodies have a moral imperative to recognize these rights.
Now that the issue is clearly a part of the international debate, failure to protect
such rights would be a failure to uphold the human rights of all persons. As such,
the OIC's assertion to the contrary was wrong; but it was also wrong for other
states to acquiesce to the OIC's demands that were based upon such a
disingenuous assertion.
B. InternationalLaw Does Define "Sexual Orientation"
The letters circulated by the Vatican and the OIC also expressed concern that
international law does not define the term "sexual orientation." 91 As such, they
suggested that inclusion of the term could lead to protections for universallydespised acts such as pedophilia. Such an assertion is inaccurate for at least two
reasons. First, it is simply erroneous. International law clearly defines the term
"sexual orientation" and this term is well understood. Second, this assertion
demonstrates the basic misunderstanding between the granting of special rights and
the recognition of human rights. This article discusses each reason below.
The OIC's assertion that "sexual orientation" is undefined in international law
is plainly erroneous. As previously discussed, the term has been used in
international law for more than two decades. Even within the UN, the UNHRC
issued decisions dealing with sexual orientation long before the Brazilian
Resolution's introduction. For example, in Toonen, the UNHRC's first decision to
mention "sexual orientation," the UNHRC definitively stated, "the reference to
'sex' in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 [of the ICCPR] is to be taken as including
sexual orientation."92
It would have been unfathomable for the UNHRC to make such a grand
statement if the term "sexual orientation" was not a clearly defined term.
Likewise, if the term did not have a clear meaning and understanding, the UNHRC
certainly would have taken care to define it before making such a bold
pronouncement. This is especially true given the importance of the term to the
case. However, at no point during its decision did the UNHRC undertake such an
effort. To the contrary, the term "sexual orientation" is so well defined in the
general parlance that the UNHRC used it sixteen times in Toonen without ever
finding a need to officially define it. 93
It is not only within the UN that "sexual orientation" is clearly defined; it has
a universally understood definition. Courts and committees of national and
international jurisdiction (including, inter alia, those in France, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States) have included the term "sexual

Nov. 5, 2005, http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/577.
91. Sanders, supra note 20.
92. Toonen, U.N.H.R. Conun'n No. 488 T 8.7.
93. Id. (including individual opinion of Mr. Bertil Wennergren).
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orientation" in their judicial decisions 94 Not only have judicial and quasi-judical
bodies readily adopted the term because of its plain meaning; numerous binding
and non-binding international documents and reports throughout the world have
adopted the term.95 Given the broad official use of the term "sexual orientation"
throughout the world, the assertion that "sexual orientation" is an undefined term is
simply preposterous.
It is, in fact, the immediate reaction of those opposing the Brazilian
Resolution that proves the argument's flaw. At no point did any in the opposition
ask for clarification or definition of the term. Yet, they still knew they were
opposed to the introduction of the Brazilian Resolution. That the Vatican and the
OIC immediately reacted against the introduction of the Brazilian Resolution
proves the term "sexual orientation" has a plain and well understood meaning.
Had this not been so, then neither the Vatican nor the OIC could have been
immediately opposed to the Brazilian Resolution. It was only because the meaning
of the term was so well defined that Vatican and OJC were immediately against the
Brazilian Resolution.
Additionally, the claim that the term "sexual orientation" is too vague rings
hollow. The term is certainly no more vague than the phrase used to punish sexual
minorities throughout the OIC's member states. Laws prohibiting "carnal
knowledge of any person against the order of nature" 96 are common in many of the
countries represented by the OJC. Yet, these countries use these laws, vague as
they are, to routinely punish only sexual minorities. This is true despite the science
indicating it is the nature of these individuals to desire having sex with someone of
the same-sex.97
94. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581 (2003) (using the term "sexual orientation" without
defining it); EB v. France, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., 4, 9, available at (finding the same); Ghaidan v.
Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, T 9 [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1533 (appeal taken from England) (U.K.),
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200304/ldjudgmt/jd040621/gha-1.htm (finding
the same); Kamer, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R., 133; Halpern v. Canada, [2003] 14 BHRC 687, O.J. 2268, T 6
(Ct. App. Ont. June 10, 2003), available at http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2003/june
/halpernC39172.htm (finding the same).
95. See supraIntroduction (discussing prior attempts to legislate rights of sexual minorities).
96. See Douglas Karekona Singiza, Exorcising the Antiquity Spirit of Intolerance: Possibilities
and Dilemmas of Decriminalising Sodomy Laws in Uganda, 11 (Oct. 29, 2007) (unpublished LL.M.
dissertation, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa) available at
http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/5851/1/singiza 2007.pdf. (quoting the Uganda statute that
criminalizes homosexual acts).
97. While the cause of homosexuality is far from settled, much science supports the proposition
that homosexuality is a genetic predisposition. See George Rice et al., Male Homosexuality: Absence of
Linkage to MicrosatelliteMarkers at Xq28, 284 SCI. 665, 665 (1999) ("Several lines of evidence have
implicated genetic factors in homosexuality"), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint
/284/5414 /665.pdf. But see, P.S. Bearman, Opposite-Sex Twins and Adolescent Same-Sex Attraction,
107 AM. J. Soc. 1179, 1179 (2005) ("the pattern of concordance (similarity across pairs) of same-sex
preference for sibling pairs does not suggest genetic influence independent of social context").
However, even if sexual orientation is a choice made by homosexuals, the argument that those choosing
homosexuality should be granted the same rights granted to all individuals is not diminished by such a
conclusion. This is because homosexuals and other sexual minorities are nonetheless human and
therefore just as deserving of basic human rights.
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The second reason the argument is flawed is that it shows a basic
misunderstanding between granting special rights and protecting human rights.
The Brazilian Resolution sought to do only the latter. Even if one accepted the
argument that the term's vagueness would lead to the inclusion of pedophilia, such
an inclusion would not grant pedophiles any special rights.98 The Brazilian
Resolution sought to grant all sexual minorities (including, hypothetically,
pedophiles) only the basic human right to be free from discrimination for their
existence. Such a basic recognition of human rights would not remove any
domestic sanctions that might be imposed for non-consensual (i.e. forced or
exploitative) acts. The difference is one of being versus doing, and those fearful of
the inclusion of persons such as pedophiles miss the key element present in the
legal acts of sexual minorities; they are committed between consenting adults. 99
International law clearly defines the term "sexual orientation." Universal use
of the term with a clear understanding of its meaning spans several decades. And,
even if some construe it to include persons such as pedophiles or rapists, such an
inclusion would have been of no consequence to the adoption of the Brazilian
Resolution. As such, the argument that international law does not define "sexual
orientation" is simply devoid of merit.
C. Freedom ofReligion Necessarily Includes Freedomfrom Religion
As their third argument against the Brazilian Resolution, both the OIC and the
Vatican asserted that religious law would prevent them from recognizing the
Brazilian Resolution and that, if adopted, there would be severe consequences.100
By invoking the tenants of their religious laws to negate the human rights of sexual
minorities, the OIC and the Vatican exposed the inherent flaws in allowing
religious law to exist within the framework of the UN.
This section discusses those flaws, but in the process it presents a much
broader argument than the previous sections. It looks at the history and framework
of the UN, using the case of sexual minorities to expose why religious law cannot
co-exist with international human rights laws within the UN. In so doing, the
purpose is not to promote religious intolerance, but rather to promote religious
freedom. This section argues that when religious law and religious freedom
conflict, as is often the case, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

98. It is odd that the concern expressed is for pedophiles rather than rapists. Perhaps that is
because a concern for rapists would require the OIC to acknowledge the many acts of rape its member
states perpetrate against sexual minorities in an attempt to "correct" their behavior. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, BREAKING THE SILENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (1994) and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CRIMES OF HATE, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE:
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT BASED ON SEXUAL IDENTITY (2001), available at http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/info/ACT40/016/2001/en.
99. At all times, this paper takes as a given that the sex acts discussed consist of acts between two
consenting adults. While the issue of what constitutes consent is an interesting one, it is not for this
paper. Nonetheless, this paper does not suggest that those persons (sexual minorities or otherwise)
engaged in non-consensual sex acts, should be outside the reach of the law.
100. Sanders, supra note 20.
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requires religious freedom to reign supreme. To best represent this argument, this
section takes as its example the existence of Shari'a law 01 within the UN. 102
To properly understand the rights guaranteed by the UDHR, one must look
beyond the text of the document. That is not to say that the text should be ignored;
only that one must consider it within its broader context, taking into account both
the document's history and the framework of its guarantees. This section briefly
discusses each of these concerns-looking first to the text, then exploring both the
history and framework of the UDHR. After properly framing its significance, this
section proceeds to the broader discussion of why religious law cannot properly
co-exist with international human rights law.
1. The Text, History, and Framework of the UDHR
To best understand the significance of the UDHR's guarantee of religious
freedom, one must first look to the document's text. Article 2 of the UDHR states
"everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as ... religion."10 3 Article 18 further asserts,
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manfest his religion or belief in
teaching,practice,worship and observance."104 Read together, these two Articles
clearly affirm the right of all persons, without distinction of any kind, to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion, which includes the right to practice and
worship in one's own way. Such is the text of the UDHR, but as simple as that
statement may sound, one cannot fully understand its meaning without looking to
both the history and framework of the UDHR.
When trying to understand the UDHR's guarantee of religious freedom, one
must also look to the UN's history-including the horrific events that preceded its
formation. Specifically, one must not forget the enormous role religion played in
fostering the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis during World War II. It was the
extermination of millions of people, based on both religious and ethnic grounds,
which led to the birth of the UN in 1945. Not only did World War II see the most
rapid killing of members of a religious minority in human history, 05 but the Nazis'
actions were condoned, and at times assisted, by numerous religious organizations
101. Islamic law. "The Arabic word means literally 'a way to a watering place,' and thus, a path to
be followed. According to Muslim belief, it is the path ordained by God for the guidance of mankind,
and must be followed by all Muslims." JAMILA HUSSAIN, ISLAM: ITS LAW AND SOCIETY 28 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
102. This is not done in an attempt to disparage Islam or Shari'a law. It is done only because
Shari'a law provides the clearest example of the inherent conflict between religious and international
law. However, within the context of the Brazilian Resolution, the arguments put forth below would
apply equally to those states that followed the lead of the Vatican, which also asserted that religious law
would prevent it from recognizing the Brazilian Resolution.
103. UIDHR, supranote 3, art. 2.
104. Id. art. 18 (emphasis added).
105. D. NIEWYK & FRANCIS NICOSIA, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE HOLOCAUST 45 (2000)

(estimating that more than 5,000,000 Jewish people were killed by the Nazis between the years 1933
and 1945).
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throughout the world. 106 It is with these circumstances in mind that one must look
at the UDHR's promise of religious freedom. 107
Additionally, the Preamble to the UDHR clearly shows the intent to rectify
these travesties of World War II. Among other things, the Preamble states:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people. 108
Now, having read the UDHR's text, including the Preamble and the articles
specifically relating to religion, and considering those words within its historical
context, a clearer intent of its meaning emerges. Not only does the UDHR
guarantee religious freedom, but it does so for the purpose of rectifying and
preventing barbarous acts that have outraged the conscience of mankind.
However, a full understanding of the UDHR's religious-freedom guarantees also
necessitates a consideration of the UDHR's framework.
Understanding the framework of the UDHR helps solidify the proper
understanding of its religious-freedom guarantees. The U.N. General Assembly
adopted the UDHR on December 10, 1948. It is part of the U.N.'s International
Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) which consists of the UDHR, as well as the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (and its two
Optional Protocols). The U.N. General Assembly completed the IBHR in 1966
when it adopted both the ICESCR and the ICCPR. These documents work in
conjunction with one another to protect human rights throughout the world.
In reading each of the documents that make up the IBHR, it becomes clear
that the IBHR grants religious freedom to the individual, not the state. For
instance, Article 55 of the U.N. Charter states that the UN shall "promote . . .
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."1 09 The UDHR
further compels religious freedom for the individual in its statement that,

106. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT, 235-51 (2007) (describing the acquiescence of
the Vatican, which signed the very first diplomatic accord undertaken by Hitler after his seizure of
power, and other religious organizations throughout Europe who failed to even try to stop the Nazi's
attempted extermination of the Jews).
107. Article 2 of the UDHR states "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . religion," and article 18 further asserts,
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion." UDHR, supranote 3, arts. 2
& 18.
108. UDHR, supranote 3, Preamble.
109. U.N. Charter, art. 55.
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"[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights ... without distinction of any kind, such as .
. . religion."110 The ICCPR is no less precise in according the right to the
individual within the state by expressing, "the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized in the present
Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as . . . religion.""
Likewise,

Article 5 of ICESCR asserts, "[n]othing in the present Covenant may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or
freedoms recognized herein."11 2 Taken together, these documents unequivocally
establish that the rights of the individual are paramount, and that the rights
provided for and protected by these documents exist with the individual.
Having established that the UDHR's religious-freedom guarantee is granted
to the individual and intended to prevent future atrocities executed in the name of
religion, the following sub-section proceeds to the broader discussion of why
religious law cannot co-exist with international human rights law.
2. Why Religious Law Cannot Co-Exist with International Human Rights
Law
Having explored the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR) text,
history, and framework within the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR), it is
now possible to explore why religious law cannot co-exist with international
human rights law. Simply put, the IBHR prohibits the existence of theocracies
within the UN because its religious-freedom guarantees reside with the individual
(not the state), and it granted these guarantees to prevent states from executing
future atrocities in the name of religion. As such, the IBHR's goals are in direct
conflict with the goals of theocracies.
Theocracies exist not to guarantee religious freedom, but to impose religious
law upon their citizens regardless of whether their citizens ascribe to those beliefs
or not. Accordingly, theocracies necessarily violate international law in at least
two ways. First, by denying individuals the ability to worship according to the
dictates of their own conscience, theocracies deny individuals of their right to
religious freedom as guaranteed under the IBHR.113 Second, as demonstrated by
the OIC's refusal to allow the Brazilian Resolution to come to a vote, theocracies
often deny groups or individuals of basic human rights under the guise of religious
doctrine. This paper discusses both of these concepts in further detail below.

110. UDHR, supranote 3, art. 2 (emphasis added).
111. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), arts. 2, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, (emphasis added).
112. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), arts.
5, December 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, (emphasis added).
113. As previously mentioned, this argument is examined by considering the U.N. member states
that apply Shari'a law. This is done not in an attempt to disparage Islam, but simply because such states
- by deriving their domestic law almost entirely from religious texts - provide the clearest example
from which to understand this argument. Again, much of the rationale used herein can also be applied
to the Vatican and other states that rely heavily on other religious texts for their domestic law.
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By denying individuals the ability to worship according to the dictates of their
own conscience, theocracies subject religious minorities to state persecution and
deny individuals of the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees. Although not
always recognized, these guarantees necessarily embody both negative and
positive rights. All would agree that the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees
prevent a state from discriminating against individuals because of religion. This is
typically understood to mean that states may not discriminate against individuals
based upon the individual's religion. However, since the IBHR's religiousfreedom guarantees exist to prevent the types of tragedies that precipitated its
creation, it must also be true that states may not discriminate against persons
because of the state's religion. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the
IBHR's history and that its religious-freedom guarantees reside with the individual
rather than the state.
Exploring the case of sexual minorities within Shari'a law shows why this
must be the case. In countries that abide by Shari'a law, there is no other source of
law (such as the common law) and all citizens of that country are subject to the
requirements of Shari'a law. 1 14 This is true, for example, of sexual minorities who
choose to live by a religion other than Islam (presumably one that does not
condemn them for their homosexual acts)."' Although states applying Shari'a law
may allow such individuals the choice to practice another religion, many of those
states still condemn non-Islamic individuals for their homosexual acts.
Accordingly, while Shari'a law may allow sexual minorities to choose a religion
that would not condemn their sexual acts, that freedom of choice does not, by
itself, protect them from the state condemning such acts. Such a result is untenable
given the IBHR's clear intent to prevent state discrimination based upon religion.
Not only do theocracies wrongfully subject sexual minorities to state
discrimination, they also prevent sexual minorities from fully practicing the
religion they choose. As previously discussed, Article 18 of the UDHR ensures
that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in teaching practice, worship and observance."1 16 However, by requiring nonIslamic citizens to adhere to Shari'a law, such states deny those individuals of the
right to "manifest [their] religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance." Accordingly, by subjecting sexual minorities to punishments for acts
not prohibited under their own religion, Shari'a law prevents sexual minorities
114. HUSSAIN, supra note 101, at 6 ("Islamic law is entirely religious. In theory, there is no
separation between 'church' and state.").
115. While many Islamic interpretations of both the Qur'an and the Hadith assert that both
explicitly refer to homosexuality as a grave sin punishable by stoning, there are those who contest
whether homosexuality is even prohibited by the tenets of Islam. See id at 9 ("Islamic law prohibits ...
some types of personal relationships, such as . . . homosexual relationships"). But see, Narayan, supra
note 36, at 342 ("historical analyses indicate that there is great variance in the interpretation of Islamic
religious principles with respect to homosexuality . . . [which] is not explicitly referenced in the
Q'uran").
116. UIDHR, supranote 3, art. 18.
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from fully practicing the religion of their own choosing. Unless the state allows a
person to both freely choose and fully practice their right to religious freedom, that
state denies its citizens of the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees.
Certainly, however, one could argue that the IBHR's goal is only to prevent
states from discriminating against individuals because of their chosen religion,
rather than preventing states from instituting religious law. Put another way, it is
arguable that the IBHR requires only that a state treat all religious groups equally
and not grant certain rights to one religious group while denying such rights to
other religious groups. Therefore, one could assert that Shari'a law's presence
within the UN does not violate the IBHR, because the law in those states applies
equally to all citizens regardless of their religion. However, such an understanding
of the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees is horribly restrictive and does not
offer the protections necessary to prevent the types of atrocities that prompted the
UDHR's creation."
As previously discussed, nations developed the UDHR in response to the
barbarous acts perpetrated during World War II. Given the oppressive historical
backdrop of the UDHR's creation, it is difficult to imagine how the UDHR's
framers would condone the imposition of religious ideals upon any group in the
name of religious freedom. That the Jews of Europe were free to exercise their
religion did not prevent the Nazis from killing several million of them. Likewise,
that sexual minorities living under Shari'a law are free to practice a religion that
would not condemn them in the afterlife does not prevent states from applying
Shari'a law to condemn them in this life. That the IBHR's religious-freedom
guarantees would allow such a curious result seems dubious, especially given the
fact that sexual minorities also endured the wrath of the Nazis' extermination
attempts.118 Consequently, if the IBHR's religious-freedom guarantees mean
anything, they must include not only the freedom of religion, but also the freedom
from religion. Theocracies necessarily deny their citizens of the latter right, and as
such their existence within the UN is inconsistent with the IBHR's religiousfreedom guarantees.
While theocracies necessarily deny individuals of the IBHR's religiousfreedom guarantees, they also violate international law by using religious doctrine
to cover blatant human rights violations. Exploring the story of the Brazilian
Resolution more closely shows why this is true. In opposing the Brazilian
Resolution, the OIC and Vatican asserted that homosexuality is contrary to their
religious law. 119 However, the OIC went even further. Speaking on behalf of the
OIC, Pakistan stated that adoption of the Brazilian Resolution would lead to
significant repercussions. 120 By invoking the teachings of their religious law, the
117. See supraPartIIJ.C (explaining the history leading to the UDHR's creation).
118. It is estimated that "some 50,000 gays were branded criminals and degenerates by the Third
Reich and 10,000 to 15,000 went to concentration camps, from which few ever returned." BBC News,
Berlin to Mark Nazis' Gay Victims (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/3314887.stm
119. Sanders, supra note 20.
120. See id. (stating that the Pakistan delegate asserted that "attempts to develop norms which
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OIC and Vatican exposed the second flaw of allowing theocracies to exist within
the UN; theocracies often deny groups or individuals of basic human rights under
the guise of religious doctrine.
In preventing the Commission from voting on the Brazilian Resolution, the

OIC and Vatican also denied those citizens of many other rights. The Brazilian
Resolution's adoption would have affirmed that sexual minorities are included
within the scope of numerous international human rights documents, thereby
explicitly granting such rights to sexual minorities. Had the Commission adopted
the Brazilian Resolution, there would have been no question that the protections of
those documents included sexual minorities. However, because the Commission
never voted on the Resolution, whether the Commission intends for sexual
minorities to be included within the documents invoked by the Brazilian
Resolution's language remains an open question. And, at least for now, states are
arguably free to continue subjecting sexual minorities to "persistent human rights
violations." 21
Nevertheless, in considering whether the Brazilian Resolution's stagnation
leaves the question open, it is important to note that "[h]uman rights have a
particular pre-occupation with disadvantaged individuals and groups. This preoccupation is reflected in numerous provisions of international human rights law,
not least those enshrining the principles of non-discrimination and equality." 22 As
such, the IBHR's text and history caution against an interpretation that would
negate the human rights of sexual minorities. Throughout history, millions of
people have been and continue to be slaughtered in the name of religion. 123 Sexual
minorities are one such group that continues to be subjected to "persistent human

rights violations."1 2 4 This, despite the UDHR's clear dictate that "[e]veryone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in [the UDHR], without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status."125
It is immaterial whether the UDHR should include sexual minorities within
the guise of "sex," "other status," or "everyone." Under any interpretation, it is
difficult to understand how one could read the UDHR's broad language as
excluding sexual minorities, especially when considering that sexual minorities
were among those intentionally killed by the Nazis. 126 Accordingly, even without
directly contradict fundamental value systems need to be avoided . . . . No Islamic society would be
able to accept any obligation which directly contradicts the basic tenants of our religion.").
121. O'Flaherty & Fisher,supranote 11, at 208.
122. Paul Hunt & Gillian MacNoughton, A Human Rights-BasedApproach to Health Indicators,in
EcoNOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION 303 (Mashood A. Baderin & Robert
McCorquodale eds., 2007).
123. See HITCHENS, supra note 106, at 235-51 (discussing numerous examples of mass killings
perpetrated in the name of religion).
124. O'Flaherty & Fisher,supranote 11, at 208.
125. UIDHR, supranote 3, art. 2.
126. It is estimated that "some 50,000 gays were branded criminals as degenerates by the Third
Reich and 10,000 to 15,000 went to concentration camps, from which few ever returned." BBC News,
Berlin to Mark Nazis' Gay Victims, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe
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the Commission's adoption of the Brazilian Resolution, those human rights
documents invoked by the Resolution's text necessarily extend to sexual
minorities. But, by invoking religious doctrine, the OIC and the Vatican have so
far succeeded in denying these basic human rights to sexual minorities. Such a
result is inapposite with international law, and exposes one reason why theocracies
should not exist within the UN.
III. PROGRESS MADE IN THE ADVANCEMENT OF RIGHTS FOR SEXUAL MINORITIES
SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN RESOLUTION

To be sure, Brazil made a major misstep in presenting the Brazilian
Resolution without first gamering enough support to ensure its passage. However,
that does not mean that no good has come from its introduction. As previously
mentioned, the Commission's inability to pass the Brazilian Resolution was not a
complete failure in terms of advancing sexual minorities' rights. In fact, by raising
the profile of human rights and sexual orientation, the Brazilian Resolution helped
advance those rights throughout international law-despite its demise. And,
perhaps that is all that Brazil sought to do by introducing its Resolution.
Since 2003, when Brazil first introduced its Resolution to the Commission,
supportive governments have introduced numerous similarly themed documents to
other UN bodies. On December 18, 2008, France and The Netherlands presented
the U.N. General Assembly with the first declaration concerning gay rights.
Although originally intended as a resolution, it lacked support for adoption as such
and was quickly met with an opposing statement from the OIC. 127 It is now known
as the United Nations Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity ("Statement"). 128 Interestingly, the Statement is more strongly worded
than was the Brazilian Resolution. It condemns, among other things, "human
rights violations based on sexual orientation or gender identity wherever they
occur."1 29 However, despite its strong language, the Statement won the support of
sixty-six countries in the U.N. General Assembly.130
Additionally, countries signed multiple statements expressing concern for
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and altogether sixty
countries have signed at least one statement.131 Most significantly, on January 12,
2006, Norway presented the U.N. Human Rights Council with a "statement on
human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity on behalf
of ... 54 states,"13 2 which "urge[d] the Human Rights Council to pay due attention

/3314887.stm.
127. Neil MacFarquhar, In a First, Gay Rights Are Pressedat the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008,
at A22.
128. Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, G.A. Res. 2435, T 6, 4th
plen. mtg., (Dec. 18 2008).
129. Id.
130. MacFarquhar, supranote 127, at A22.
131. ILGA, SUPPORTIVE GOVERNMENTS: 60 COUNTRIES HAVE PUBLICLY SUPPORTED SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AT THE CHR/HRC BETwEEN 2003 AND 2008 (2008), available at http://ilga.org/ilga/
en/article/583.
132. The Norwegian Statement, Human Rights Council, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.ilga-
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to human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity." 133 The
Norwegian Statement was particularly notable because several Islamic States
actually signed onto it, 134despite Pakistan's assertion that no Islamic state could
ever support any document expressing concern over human rights violations of
sexual minorities.13 5
Outside of the UN, numerous Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) have
continued to work feverishly to protect the rights of sexual minorities. Although it
did not occur during a session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Brazil did
eventually get a version of its Resolution passed by an international governing
body. In 2008, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a slightly
modified version of the original Brazilian Resolution. The "non-binding resolution
was passed by consensus, meaning that all OAS countries agreed including the
United States."l 36
In addition to the work of IGOs, individual experts in the field of human
rights and sexual orientation have been hard at work as well. In March of 2007, a
group of human rights experts launched the Yogyakarta Principles on the
Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity (Yogyakarta Principles). The Yogyakarta Principles are a
collection of twenty-nine principles relating to human rights and sexual
orientation. Each enumerated principle contains recommendations directed at
states to assure their fulfillment. "The Principles are intended as a coherent and
comprehensive identification of the obligation of States to respect, protect and
fulfill the human rights of all persons regardless of their sexual orientation or

gender identity." 137
Although the Commission failed to pass the Brazilian Resolution, it is
arguable that Brazil managed to do indirectly what it was unable to do directly.
After all, it can be assumed by Brazil's actions that it sought merely to raise the
profile of human rights violations based on sexual orientation. Certainly it has
managed to do that. While there are still numerous states that vehemently oppose
adoption of such a resolution, many other states, IGOs, and NGOs have worked
tirelessly over the past six years to advance those rights.

europe.org/europe/issues/international/norwegian-statement at the un.
133. Id.
134. The Norwegian Statement was signed by Albania, which is member state of the OIC.
Additionally it was signed by Bosnia & Herzegovina and Cyprus, both of which have observer status
with the OIC. See id. (listing all signatories); Organization of the Islamic Conference, Member States,
http://www.oic-oci.org/member states.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (listing OIC member states);
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Observers http://www.oic-oci.org/page detail.asp?pid=179
(last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (listing OIC observers).
135. Sanders, supra note 20.
136. Samantha Singson, Brazil Successfully Pushes Homosexual Rights at OAS Meeting, 34 CATH.
FAM. & HUM. RTS. INST. 1, 1 (2008), available at http://www.c-fam.org/publications/id.696/pub
detail.asp.
137. O'Flaherty & Fisher,supranote 11, at 207.
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All this adds up to show that the rights of sexual minorities are a concern of
the international community, and that those concerns are being recognized and
slowly advanced. The Commission was designed so that all states would be held
to the same human rights standards. With that in mind, the Brazilian Resolution
should have passed, for it sought nothing more than a mere acknowledgment that
states show concern for violations of human rights based on sexual orientation.
However, the states opposing the Brazilian Resolution were those states most
likely to be guilty of committing egregious violations of human rights against
sexual minorities. In failing to pass the Brazilian Resolution, the Commission
itself failed in its duty to promote and protect human rights.
CONCLUSION

Throughout the world, numerous groups are denied basic human rights
because of their status within society. Oftentimes, those committing violations of
human rights against these groups assert that they have a perfectly valid reason for
doing so. In the case of sexual minorities, the reasons asserted for such violations
appear at first glance to be logical. Surely, no one wants to grant special rights to
sexual predators such as rapists and pedophiles, nor does anyone wish to rely upon
laws that are based on undefined terms. Furthermore, religion is a very important
and sacred part of millions of lives, and deserves the utmost deference.
However, this paper has attempted to explain why those arguments are not as
sound as they may first seem. Sexual minorities are not seeking special rights,
only basic human rights. Moreover, sexual predators are easily distinguishable
from sexual minorities. The latter group deals with adults who have consensual
sexual relations with one another, whereas the former does not. Additionally,
while the use of undefined terms can bring havoc upon the legal system, the term
"sexual orientation" presents no such problems. Numerous laws and judicial
decisions throughout the world use the term. And as for religion, while it does
deserve a certain level of respect, a concern for human rights deserves more. The
international community cannot allow religion to excuse persistent human rights
violations.

